No WMDs in Iraq? Not Quite!

During President Bush’s farewell he said that there were no WMDs in Iraq, but the Iraqi memos and transcripts retrieved by the US military paint a very different picture. In fact WMDs were in Iraq. I was told by a Captain of the US Navy who was in Iraq that there were WMDs and that President Bush did not want it made public. Why? Most likely because of national security reasons. When the yellowcake was sent to Canada to be demilitarized, it was kept quiet in order to protect the yellowcake from being intercepted.  I was told that some of the yellowcake from Iraq ended up in Iran. This is probably another reason the truth about the WMDs has not been publicly released.  I was in the United States Air Force in the 1990’s and held a Top Secret Clearance.  We were not able to talk to anyone about the classified information we knew until is was publicly released.  Once we saw it on CNN, we could talk about it.  Ok, so if this information was released March 2008, but totally suppressed by the Pentagon and main stream media, as far as Bush knew the information was still classified.  Another reason is because the person in charge of the Agricultural Department for Saddam was also the head of the WMD program.  Why is this important?  Well lots of the WMDs were stored as fertilizers or pesticides, but could easily be tranferred into WMDs as needed.  This threat was described by Rolf Eckeus the first lead UN inspector.

From chapter 4 of The Link:

The truth is Iraq began its biological weapons laboratory in the mid-1970’s. “At Saddam’s request, Izzat al-Douri, a high-ranking Baath official who served on the Revolutionary Command Council as minister of agriculture, traveled to Paris in November 1974 where he signed a contract with France’s Institut Merieux to set up Iraq’s first bacteriological laboratory.” After getting the biological agent laboratory up and running, in 1975 Saddam began working on chemical weapons. Saddam sought the means to produce poison gases such as mustard, Tabun, and Sarin. Under the guise of agricultural development the manufacturing of lethal phosphorus based pesticides began. These pesticides had been banned in other Western countries due to their lethal qualities. It turns out Sarin and Tabun are made from phosphorus materials. Iraq had large natural phosphate deposits near the Syrian border.

From ch 10 of The Link:

Transcript ISGQ-2003-00003598 is dated January 4, 2001, so its just eight months before the September 11, 2001 attacks. Saddam was concerned that the U.S. might bomb Iraq. This transcript describes that the Iraqi leadership was concerned that Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons sites may be bombed. The Iraqi Intelligence Service had learned that the American weapons manufacturers were developing bombs that were able to “penetrate deeply into the ground or concrete.” The transcript says that if one of these sites was hit and not completely annihilated by the blast, then the chemical and biological weapons could “be detected from the air by some hazardous airborne substances.” The transcript goes on to boast that “some targets are mobile, and Iraq has proven that it moved throughout the country very expansive equipment and data to evade United Nations’ weapons inspection teams. Still, precision is essential and fundamental to the Americans if they want to strike vital targets while minimizing civilian losses simultaneously.” (Appendix, Figure 66) Clearly Saddam still had both chemical and biological weapons as of the writing of this memo, January 4, 2001. The memo proves that Saddam used mobile units to produce biological and chemical weapons and to evade UN weapons inspectors.

Rolf Ekeus, the leader of the first UN Inspections Team to go into Iraq, warned that these production facilities were the biggest threat. The reason is that chemical and biological weapons can lose their potency over time, but having production facilities that can quickly produce the agent and move them to where they are needed is the most serious threat. Rolf Ekeus warned in 2003 that “This combination of researchers, engineers, know-how, precursors, batch production techniques and testing is what constituted Iraq‘s chemical threat — its chemical weapon. The rather bizarre political focus on the search for rusting drums and pieces of munitions containing low-quality chemicals has tended to distort the important question of WMD in Iraq and exposed the American and British administrations to unjustified criticism. The real chemical warfare threat from Iraq … is the chance that Iraqi chemical weapons specialists would sign up with terrorist networks such as al Qaida…. While biological weapons are not easily adapted for battlefield use, they are potentially … more devastating as a means for massive terrorist onslaught on civilian targets.”

What biological weapons were being produced? Well Colin Powell said that anthrax and botulinum toxins had been produced. We know from the attacks on the Kurds that Saddam also had typhoid spores and cholera. Colin Powell goes on to warn, “In fact, they can produce enough dry biological agent in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people. And [a] dry agent of this type is the most lethal form for human beings.” Another more chilling fact is that Iraq was producing weaponized anthrax. When Iraq finally admitted to having biological weapons in 1995 the quantities were large. Colin Powell continued by explaining that less than a teaspoon of dry anthrax could cause catastrophic results. He gave the example of when the United States Senate was shutdown in the fall of 2001 because of an envelope with less than a teaspoon of anthrax. Several hundred people had to receive emergency medical care, and the two postal workers who handled the envelope were killed.

Kevin M. Woods, and James Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights From Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 5, 79.

Rolf Ekeus, “The Washington Post,” The Washington Post 29 June 2003.

Con Coughlin, Saddam His Rise and Fall, 1st Harper Perennial Ed., Fully Updated and Rev. ed. New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2005, 127.

Ibid., 128-129.


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